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Abstract
Political actors form coalitions around their joint policy beliefs in order to influ-
ence the policy process on contentious issues such as climate change or population
aging. The present article explains the formation and maintenance of coalitions by
focusing on the ways that actors adopt policy beliefs from other actors. A policy
debate is a complex system that exhibits network dependencies both in cross-
sectional and longitudinal ways when actors contribute ideological statements
to the debate. In such a temporal network, learning of policy beliefs matters
in three complementary ways: positive reciprocity through bonding relationships
within coalitions, innovation across coalitions through bridging relationships, and
negative reciprocity through repulsion, or polarization, of adversarial coalitions
by reinforcement of conflictual relationships. We test this theory of endogenous
coalition formation in policy debates using a novel inferential technique combining
network and event history analysis and find systematic evidence for the interplay
of the three coalition formation mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
Policy process theory suggests that political actors form coalitions around their joint be-
liefs in order to influence the policy process (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier
and Weible 2014; Hajer 1995; Henry, Lubell and McCoy 2011; Weible, Sabatier and
McQueen 2009; Leifeld and Haunss 2012; Leifeld 2013, 2016, 2017; Fisher, Leifeld and
Iwaki 2013). Despite a plethora of contributions on the existence and significance of
“advocacy coalitions” and “discourse coalitions,” little systematic evidence has yet been
gathered on how coalitions are formed and maintained around joint policy beliefs. The
existing literature argues that learning plays a key role for the formation and main-
tenance of coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), but how exactly learning is
causally connected to coalition structure largely remains a black box. Instead, recent
work focused on belief coalitions as an independent variable and coordination between
actors as an explanandum (e. g., Henry, Lubell and McCoy 2011). While this develop-
ment helps explaining the structure of policy networks as a function of actors’ policy
beliefs, the original puzzle of belief formation and thereby coalition formation around
shared beliefs persists. Therefore we unpack the notion of learning in advocacy or dis-
course coalitions and explain coalition formation and maintenance in policy debates as
a complex network phenomenon.
Our contribution explains the formation and maintenance of coalitions by focusing
on the ways that actors adopt policy beliefs from other actors in a policy process. We
argue that learning within and across coalitions matters in three different ways.
First, as actors in a complex policy process face substantial uncertainty and risk,
they learn from other actors by utilizing bonding relationships (Berardo and Scholz
2010; Berardo 2014; Berardo and Lubell 2016). Coalitions are formed and maintained
by learning policy beliefs from actors who demonstrated a very similar profile of policy
beliefs in the past. This extends the “risk hypothesis” from the literature on collabora-
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tive governance (Berardo and Scholz 2010; Berardo 2014; Berardo and Lubell 2016) to
the case of belief formation and coalition formation. Actors infer their adjacent coalition
members by observing the policy debate and learn from actors with strongly similar
beliefs. We call this mechanism positive reciprocity and provide micro-level evidence
for its strong role in shaping coalition formation.
Second, in addition to these strong belief ties, actors learn beliefs through weak ties.
For this to happen, two conditions must be satisfied: if an actor observes that many
other actors expressed a certain policy belief and if many of these other actors had at
least a minimal degree of belief congruence with the focal actor around other issues,
this signals to the actor that the policy belief in question is ideologically compatible
and worth adopting. Thus, actors not only seek bonding relationships through positive
reciprocity; actors also actively seek to adopt innovative beliefs that are compatible with
their remaining preference profile through bridging relationships (Berardo and Scholz
2010). Coalition formation therefore builds on trust in familiar actors on the one hand
and on trust in the congruence of their own belief system coupled with the transitivity
of other actors’ belief systems on the other hand. However, bridging across coalitions
is contingent on minimizing the risk of adopting incompatible policy beliefs by only
considering actors with a minimal level of trust through previous belief congruence.
We call this second mechanism innovation learning.
Third, learning entails drawing experiences from negative examples. Actors consider
with whom they had substantive conflicts in the past, and they tend to oppose the
current policy beliefs of these actors. This reinforcement of conflictual relationships
leads to a repulsion between different coalitions and therefore complements positive
reciprocity, which serves to increase the congruence within coalitions. We call this
mechanism negative reciprocity.
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The three mechanisms together are complementary. They serve to increase congru-
ence within coalitions through mutual reinforcement of positive relationships, learning
of belief innovations across coalitions, and repulsion between coalitions through rein-
forcement of conflictual relationships. We test this theory of coalition formation and
belief learning using state-of-the-art dynamic network analysis and an empirical policy
process over the course of nine years at a daily time resolution and find compelling
micro-level evidence that supports our three-pronged theory of endogenous coalition
formation.
2 Policy Debates as Networks
Politics is about “who gets what, when, how” (Lasswell 1950). This extends far beyond
institutional arenas like Congress or the executive. How political issues are understood
and why some solutions to political problems make it onto the parliamentary and ex-
ecutive agendas while others are weeded out during public debate is at least of equal
importance, but lacks any systematic understanding (Downs 1972). Research on these
early stages of the policy process (Sabatier and Weible 2014) has been struggling to
provide convincing answers to one of the most pressing questions on agenda setting:
how do political actors, such as interest groups or legislators, decide to contribute nor-
mative statements about their desired policy outcomes to the public debate? In other
words, how do policy debates operate at the micro-level?
Most newspaper articles on the politics of the day are full of quotes by political
actors advocating or rejecting certain policies or policy instruments. Often they are in
direct support or contradiction of previous statements by other political actors. Lay
readers, journalists, and political analysts try to make sense of these statements by
inferring “camps,” “advocacy coalitions,” or “discourse coalitions” from a policy debate
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(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Hajer 1995). In many cases, the cleavage lines seem
clear either because interest groups have vested interests or because policies appeal in
obvious ways to partisan ideologies of actors who run for office or a seat. More often,
however, it is unclear why an actor adopts a specific issue stance and why this happens
at the specific time it is observed. Indeed, the prevailing view in the literature is
that policy preferences are fixed and allow only for minor modifications through policy
learning (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Hajer 1995). Yet, the mechanisms through
which learning occurs are opaque and need to be unpacked and tested.
Students of political processes are often content with describing macro-level varia-
tion, such as the presence of multiple advocacy or discourse coalitions in policy processes
(as an example of variation across actors and within a time unit), or issue attention
cycles with varying levels of salience of issues over time (as an example of temporal
variation without any cross-sectional differentiation). We argue that such macro-level
phenomena can be traced back to micro-level mechanisms in a theoretically meaningful
way. These mechanisms can be disentangled by considering and explaining individual
statements of political actors and their timing.
However, individual statements about actors’ policy beliefs or stances are rarely
independent of each other. Actors do not argue in isolation. The very essence of a po-
litical debate is that actors interact with each other in order to “influence the political
discourse of their day” (Hall 1993), both collaboratively and in conflict. To see this,
consider the counterfactual that no political discussion would be going on among polit-
ical actors if it were impossible to influence other actors by raising one’s voice through
the media and other outlets—possibly by altering public opinion (“issue campaigning”)
or convincing other actors more directly (“policy learning”). Hence, while useful for
some purposes, we must overcome the prevailing view that policy preferences are fixed
and instead devise empirical strategies to analyze how learning takes place. We need
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to understand how these interdependencies shape the complex topology of political
debates that ultimately leads to the emergence of coalitions in the policy process.
Our contribution therefore proposes a set of theoretical mechanisms at the micro-
level that lead endogenously to the formation and maintenance of coalitions in policy
debates. We introduce a new statistical modeling framework that allows us to test the
significance of these learning mechanisms in an empirical case study of a policy debate
observed over the course of nine years. We cast the debate as a signed bipartite graph
of actors and policy beliefs with date-stamped edges and apply our methodological
innovation. Due to their inherent dependencies, policy debates can (and should) be
modeled as networks.
One way to do so is to model a specific discourse, such as the debate on climate
change or the debate on population aging, by assuming that elements from a set of
actor vertices A = {a, i1, . . . , im−1} (where a denotes the focal actor and i1, . . . , im−1
denote other actors) is connected to elements from a set of policy belief vertices B =
{b, j1, . . . , jn−1} (where b is the focal belief and j1, . . . , jn−1 are other policy beliefs) by
positive or negative edges γ±t (a, b) (where t is the focal time point, the first element
in parentheses is the incident actor vertex and the second element in parentheses the
incident policy belief vertex). An edge γ±t ∈ Γ has a value of 1 if the actor states the
belief at time point t and 0 otherwise. Each edge has either positive (γ+t ) or negative
(γ−t ) valence, indicating that an actor supports a policy belief (γ
+
t ) or rejects a policy
belief (γ−t ). γ
±
t denotes either of the two.
A includes various interest groups, legislators, and other actors who have a potential
interest in expressing their opinion on the policy topic of the debate. B includes concrete
policy instruments or proposals. For example, in the policy debate on climate change,
policy beliefs can be the various policy proposals used in the debate, such as “cap and
trade,” “carbon tax,” or “voluntary reduction of emissions,” among others. They are
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specific and cannot be reduced to more fine-grained sub-beliefs other than on an ordinal
scale, as in more or less of a specific instrument.
At any point in time t, any actor can observe the network of actors and beliefs he
or she is embedded in up to time t− 1. This is called the network of past events,
Gt = (A;B; Γt). (1)
From the perspective of actors at the current time point t, an edge weight w±t is a
function that is applied to each event γ before time t and that reflects how long ago a
statement was made. It resembles the event’s loss in signal strength between the time
point the event happened and the current time point, or the decay in memory, when
an actor considers the network of past events in making decisions about whether and
what to contribute to a policy debate. More formally, and in line with Lerner et al.
(2013) and Brandes, Lerner and Snijders (2009), the temporally sensitive edge weight
of any statement in the network, in relation to the current time point t, is
w±t (i, j) =
∑
te<t
γ±te(i, j) · e
−(t−te)·
(
ln(2)
T1/2
)
· ln(2)
T1/2
, (2)
where te is a prior time point in the network of past events, e is Euler’s number, and
T1/2 represents a so-called half-life parameter. The half-life parameter specifies at which
rate the weight of past events should diminish.
A theoretical model about coalition formation in policy debates (Leifeld 2014) sug-
gested a number of potentially suitable micro-level mechanisms that might play a role
in coalition formation, simulated policy debates over time, and compared the resulting
topologies to stylized facts from empirical studies. While this approach reveals which
mechanisms lead to which topologies per se, an agent-based simulation model alone
cannot ascertain whether a theoretically and numerically plausible theory is indeed
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causally related to the real-world topologies because other theories or combinations of
mechanisms could potentially explain coalition formation equally well. Fitting a the-
ory on coalition formation to a policy debate at the micro level in a temporal analysis,
rather than comparing it with stylized facts at the macro level, will permit a more cred-
ible analysis of coalition formation in policy debates that moves the state of knowledge
closer to a causal understanding. Therefore the present research fits an endogenous
theory on coalition formation to an empirical policy debate at the micro-level using
new techniques in inferential network analysis.
3 Coalitions in the Policy Process
“Coalitions” are a central element in theories of the policy process (Sabatier and Weible
2014). The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) attributes a central role to clusters
of actors with congruent policy beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). According to
proponents of the ACF, there are usually between two and five coalitions in any given
policy process. Advocacy coalitions emerge because of overlapping functional roles
of actors (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998) and, primarily, because of mutually reinforcing
policy learning within coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), thus leading to a
remarkable stability of coalitions over multiple decades. In a policy network of various
actors with partly compatible and partly incompatible policy preferences, actors with
similar institutional roles will stick together and mutually reinforce and complement
each other’s position. For example, in an environmental–industrial conflict, two envi-
ronmental NGOs may hold only partly congruent policy beliefs initially, but they are
more likely to adopt each other’s policy instrument claims than their political oppo-
nents’ claims in order to gain or maintain a powerful position in the policy network
through the operation of a cohesive coalition with coherent policy beliefs.
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However, coalitions need not rely on institutional cues for policy instrument learn-
ing. Coalitions can also emerge as the result of previous states of the network, as in
a Markov process. For example, if actors A and B demonstrated relatively congruent
policy preferences in the recent past, and actor C demonstrated a relatively incon-
gruent preference profile, then policy beliefs may diffuse from A to B or vice-versa.
Such a diffusion of policy beliefs among actors is the result of perceived joint coalition
membership—without the actual need for a formal shared institutional role. Learning
is rather the result of each actor’s observation of the other actors’ stated beliefs. This
leads to increasing homogeneity of policy beliefs within coalitions over time (Leifeld
2014). We call coalition formation dynamics that do not involve exogenous covariates,
such as an actor’s institutional role, endogenous mechanisms of coalition formation.
Both types of coalition formation, endogenous and exogenous, can interact in a single
policy debate.
The literature on opinion dynamics has explored similar dynamics of endogenous
coalition formation (e. g., Altafini 2012; Antal, Krapivsky and Redner 2005; Marvel
et al. 2011; Quattrociocchi, Caldarelli and Scala 2014), where nodes in a network strive
for a structural balance in opinions in their local network environment (Cartwright and
Harary 1956). An actor with friends who hold similar opinions as the focal actor will
be reinforced in his or her views while different opinions in the network neighborhood
may lead to a tipping of the actor’s opinion. The extreme outcome of a completely
balanced system, in which the network breaks apart into two entirely separate but
internally homogenous coalitions, is known as a monotone dynamical system (Altafini
2012). Empirical networks, however, usually feature a mix of balanced and unbalanced
triads because the endogenous coalition formation mechanism through learning and
reinforcement within coalitions is complemented by other theoretical mechanisms.
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The popular notion of “discourse coalitions” in the literature on argumentative
discourse analysis (Hajer 1995) captures essentially the same dynamic as posited by the
ACF. The basic premise is that actors try to manipulate other actors’ view of reality
through the articulation of arguments in a policy debate. The success of a discourse
coalition in manipulating a debate is a function of the coherence of the coalition’s set
of arguments (Leifeld and Haunss 2012). Therefore, like in the Advocacy Coalition
Framework, actors with already similar positions have an incentive to further mutually
reinforce and adopt each other’s statements in a policy debate in order to appear more
convincing and exercise greater power.
In other words, actors learn from other actors in a policy debate, and the outcome of
these learning processes are coalitions. This learning of policy beliefs can occur through
multiple plausible mechanisms. In the following paragraphs, we seek to unpack these
mechanisms, which contribute to the formation and maintenance of coalitions in a policy
debate: positive reciprocity, innovation learning, and negative reciprocity.
3.1 Positive Reciprocity
First, we operationalize mutual learning and reinforcement through the notion of pos-
itive reciprocity in a signed bipartite graph. Positive reciprocity means that an actor
tends to make statements in a policy debate that are compatible with the recently ob-
served statements of other actors in the policy debate if the actor identifies these other
actors as compatible in terms of their policy beliefs.
In line with the risk hypothesis, which explains policy network formation (Berardo
and Scholz 2010; Berardo 2014; Berardo and Lubell 2016), actors face uncertainty and
risk when they reveal their policy beliefs to other actors. They reduce this risk by
bonding, which is the act of learning predominantly from those actors who already share
very similar revealed policy belief profiles with the focal actor. Learning from these
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actors serves to minimize uncertainty and risk by relying on trustworthy information.
The odds of being criticized strongly are low if other actors with a similar coalition
position advanced similar claims in the past. This strong bonding behavior is not just
a building block of policy network formation; it also explains belief system formation
and coalitions.
In network terms, positive reciprocity is operationalized through balanced four-
cycles: in a signed bipartite graph, an actor a will tend to make a positive statement
about policy belief b if other actors i also referred to b in a positive way and these other
actors already shared other positive beliefs j with a (first panel of Figure 1). Similarly,
a will tend to make a negative statement b if a had negative shared statements j with
other actors i in the past and if these other actors i also refer to b in a negative way
(second panel of Figure 1). Positive reciprocity can also mean that a makes a positive
statement b if a had congruent negative statements together with many i and actors i
made a positive statement about b (third panel of Figure 1) or that a makes a negative
statement b if a had congruent positive statements together with many i and actors i
made a negative statement about b (fourth panel of Figure 1). All of these cases reflect
the tendency that an actor adopts a policy belief from other actors who are proximate
with regard to their policy beliefs.
[Figure 1 about here.]
At the same time, it matters for policy learning within coalitions when these prior
statements were observed by focal actor a. If they all occurred in the recent past, the
mutual support and learning is stronger because the focal actor has a good memory
of the structure of the debate and these earlier statements therefore act as a stronger
signal to a. Conversely, trigger statements in the distant past, say, five years ago, may
have a weak influence on a’s discursive activity.
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Therefore, the extent to which actor a has an incentive to contribute policy belief b
to the debate at any point in time can be expressed by a positive reciprocity network
statistic, which sums the first four cases of Figure 1 over the past network of events
and weights the statements by their temporal distance:
positive reciprocity±(Gt, a, b) = 3
√ ∑
i∈A,j∈B
w+t (a, j) · w±t (i, b) · w+t (i, j)
+ 3
√ ∑
i∈A,j∈B
w−t (a, j) · w±t (i, b) · w−t (i, j)
(3)
We posit that positive reciprocity is a foundational element of endogenous coalition
formation in policy debates, i. e., actors adopt beliefs from congruent other actors in
their effort to exercise discursive power via coalition building. We expect that this
mechanism plays a role in actors’ decisions to contribute statements to a debate:
Hypothesis 1 The stronger positive reciprocity is from the perspective of actor a at
time t with regard to policy belief b, the more likely a will adopt b at time t.
3.2 Innovation Learning
Positive reciprocity alone, however, would lead to a compartmentalization of the net-
work over time, where two coalitions with one distinct policy belief each would prevail
(Leifeld 2014; Altafini 2012). Reality is more complex: coalitions are composed of more
than one policy belief; more than two coalitions can exist empirically; and there can
be actors who do not associate perfectly with one coalition or another (Leifeld 2013,
2016).
Moreover, positive reciprocity, while useful and plausible, does not discriminate
between cases where many other actors stated the same few policy beliefs in the same
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way in the past (i. e., many actors, few beliefs) and cases where few other actors stated
many beliefs in the same way in the past (i. e., few actors, many beliefs).
For example, an actor a may be particularly inclined to learn belief concept b from
another actor i1 if the two actors exhibited congruent policy beliefs before. This would
indicate a strong case of bonding and trust between these two actors (Berardo and
Scholz 2010; Berardo 2014; Berardo and Lubell 2016; Henry, Lubell and McCoy 2011),
as hypothesized in the previous case. The first two panels of Figure 2 provide an
illustration of this bonding strategy. At the same time, however, an actor a may be
inclined to learn a policy belief concept not just because of strong incentives by imitating
an ideologically very close other actor i1, but also by observing that many other actors
i—even if otherwise not particularly close—stated another policy belief j1 with the same
stance as the focal actor a and if they are all congruent in their use of the focal belief
b. This corresponds to bridging behavior in policy networks (Berardo and Scholz 2010;
Berardo 2014; Berardo and Lubell 2016; Henry, Lubell and McCoy 2011): when the
risk of adopting information from other actors is low—as ascertained by counting how
many minimally compatible actors have stated a policy belief before—, actors reach
out and adopt information from ideologically relatively remote peers. The third and
fourth panel of Figure 2 illustrate this bridging strategy.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The positive reciprocity statistic captures both, bonding and bridging. Therefore
we need to control for this bridging behavior in order to be able to interpret the positive
reciprocity statistic as the tendency for learning through bonding. Hence we need to
devise a separate test, which captures specifically the many-actors–few-beliefs case of
bridging. We call this case innovation learning.
Innovation learning is an important building block of coalition formation and main-
tenance because it introduces innovation into coalitions. The ACF argues that learning
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takes place predominantly within coalitions, but to a certain extent also between coali-
tions, in order to ensure that coalitions adjust to innovative information. For example,
if an external event, such as a scientific report or a natural catastrophe, leads to some
new beliefs among a number of actors, the innovation learning mechanism serves to
diffuse these innovations to other actors. However, actors will only adopt these policy
beliefs if they are held by credible sources. Actors only adopt policy beliefs from other
actors if these other actors have a minimum degree of belief congruence with the focal
actor. The innovation learning mechanism tests precisely for this kind of innovative
learning from minimally congruent source actors by counting how many other actors
stated a focal belief in the same way in the past, conditional on these other actors
sharing at least one other policy belief with the focal actor, thus closing a balanced
four-cycle.
Innovation learning can be formalized as follows. First, count how many other actors
i have previously mentioned b. Let
ζ±(a, b) :=
∑
i∈A\{a}
[
t−1∑
k=1
γ±k (i, b) > 0
]
. (4)
Then, define η± as the number of actors who have previously mentioned b—unless the
count is 0, in which case η± = 1, in order to avoid division by 0 in the statistic. Let
η±(a, b) :=

ζ±(a, b) if ζ±(a, b) > 0
1 otherwise.
(5)
This enables us to define the innovation learning statistic, which is the temporally
weighted share of other actors i who referred to policy belief b and who had at least
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one other positively or negatively congruent belief j with the focal actor a:
innovation learning±(Gt, a, b)
=
3
√∑
i∈A\{a}
∑
j∈B\{b}
[∑t−1
k=1 γ
+
k (a, j) > 0
] · w±t (i, b) · [∑t−1k=1 γ+k (i, j) > 0]
η+
+
3
√∑
i∈A\{a}
∑
j∈B\{b}
[∑t−1
k=1 γ
−
k (a, j) > 0
] · w±t (i, b) · [∑t−1k=1 γ−k (i, j) > 0]
η−
,
(6)
where square brackets denote an indicator function that yields 1 if the condition con-
tained in the brackets is true and 0 otherwise. We expect that the innovation learning
mechanism contributes strongly to the topology of the policy debate:
Hypothesis 2 The stronger innovation learning is from the perspective of actor a at
time t with regard to policy belief b, the more likely a will adopt b at time t.
3.3 Negative Reciprocity
Coalitions, or groups more generally, form not just by learning and reinforcement, but
also by repulsion between different coalitions or groups (Skvoretz 2013). For example,
the literature on advocacy coalitions stresses how members of coalitions distrust op-
ponents in policy processes (Fischer et al. 2016). Once coalitions become entrenched
through positive reciprocity, they stress dissimilarities with other coalitions.
At the micro level, what we call negative reciprocity is an important factor in the
repulsion between coalitions. Negative reciprocity means that existing disagreement
between two actors is reinforced by the perception of being in different coalitions. If
actors a and i had previous disagreements over policy beliefs j, then it is likely that
these conflicts are carried forward through new disagreements over other policy beliefs.
For example, if actor a stated policy belief j1 in a positive way while actor i1 stated
j1 in a negative way and if i1 stated belief b in a negative way as well, then a will tend
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to reinforce the interpersonal or interorganizational conflict by stating b in a positive
way (fifth panel in Figure 1). If i1 stated b in a positive way, a will state b in a negative
way, given their prior conflict (eighth panel in Figure 1). Alternatively, if a stated j1 in
a negative way and i1 stated it in a positive way, a and i1 will also disagree over b one
way or the other (panels six and seven in Figure 1). These cases are all summarized
in a negative reciprocity network statistic over the network of past events, from the
perspective of actor a when considering policy belief b, summed over all previous four-
cycles, and taking into account the timing of events:
negative reciprocity±(Gt, a, b) = 3
√ ∑
i∈A,j∈B
w+t (a, j) · w±t (i, b) · w−t (i, j)
+ 3
√ ∑
i∈A,j∈B
w−t (a, j) · w±t (i, b) · w+t (i, j)
(7)
Negative reciprocity can be interpreted from an actor perspective or from an issue
conflict perspective. In the former view, actors learn from past conflicts and extend
their existing conflicts to other issues. In the latter view, there can be fundamental
differences between sets of issues; for instance, policies j1 and j2 may be intrinsically
linked because they belong to some coherent ideology I1, and, similarly, policies j3 and
j4 may be linked by some other overarching ideology I2. In that case, it is natural
for actors adhering to ideology I1 to support j1 and j2 but to reject j3 and j4. In this
view, negative reciprocity is a function of what the Advocacy Coalition Framework calls
“deep core beliefs” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).
However, both perspectives can be reconciled: even if these fundamental predeter-
mined cleavage lines exist across coalitions of actors, actors will still learn from the past
behavior of their opponents as well as their overall position in the network what their
stance on policy belief b should be, given the overarching ideologies. For example, if a
knows their positive view on j1 and recognizes i1’s opposing, negative position on j1,
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then a can learn from i1’s negative recent mention of b that j1 and b are in the same
compatible ideological package and that they should mention it in a positive way to
maintain ideological congruence, thereby distancing themselves further from i1.
In line with these considerations along the lines of structural balance and learning,
we expect negative reciprocity to play a strong role in shaping the topology of the policy
debate through repulsion between coalitions:
Hypothesis 3 The stronger negative reciprocity is from the perspective of actor a at
time t with regard to policy belief b, the more likely will a adopt b at time t.
4 Data and Methods
4.1 Data
We test our theory of endogenous coalition formation in policy debates in an empirical
case study. Using the software Discourse Network Analyzer (Leifeld 2016), we content-
analyzed 1,842 newspaper articles from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, a German
news outlet with center–right news coverage of politics, about the policy debate on
the German pension system. Articles were selected using a general search phrase, and
false positives were manually weeded out. 6,704 statements of 245 political actors over
nine years (1993–2001) were coded by two expert coders, and intercoder reliability
was checked post-hoc by two separate coders and was found to be consistently high.
The coding scheme consisted of four variables: the person who made a statement,
the organization the person belonged to, the policy belief stated by the person or
organization, and a dummy variable indicating support or rejection of the belief by
the actor. In the analysis, organizations were used as actors, in line with previous
analyses of policy networks (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Berardo and Scholz 2010). A
total of 69 beliefs were coded. These were policy instruments that reflected normative
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stances on what to do about the imminent financing problem of the pension system.
Examples include “install fertility incentives to create more contributors,” “incentivize
private savings to complement the state pension,” or “increase pension age,” among
many others.
In May 2001, a major policy reform introduced privatization measures; thus this
marks the end of the observation period. The start of the observation period was
January 1993. We use the first 657 statements from January 1993 to March 1996
to calibrate the endogenous network statistics. The number of excluded events in an
ordinal event sequence depends on the number of days on which a statement was made
and the specified half-life parameter in Equation 2. The 657 statements were issued over
the course of 200 event days. With a chosen half-life parameter of 20 event days, the
network of past events Gt is sufficiently large for all events issued after March 1996 to
ensure unbiased statistics. Therefore we define March 1996 as the start of the analysis
period. This time period also covers the national election at the end of September 1998
and the election campaign that started in March 1998. The pension debate was one of
the key topics in the election campaign. Figure 3 shows the frequency of statements
per week over the analysis period with the shaded area representing the duration of the
election campaign.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The policy debate on the German pension system in the wake of population aging is
an ideal case study for several reasons. First, Germany does not have a journalistic norm
of balanced reporting as, for example, in the U.S., which would bias the measurement
of coalition formation through newspaper data (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). We do
acknowledge that the process by which an actor gets to speak in the newspaper is
still affected by agenda setting through the media, but actors have a high degree of
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autonomy in what they say, and we can control for activity and popularity effects in
the statistical model. Second, the debate featured a high amount of uncertainty among
actors over how to solve the policy problem. The debate is situated in a historical setting
where population aging was for the first time put on the national political agenda. This
ensures a lively debate, where a number of very different arguments and positions are
exchanged. Third, the topic of public pensions is broad enough that the debate is
multi-dimensional rather than two-dimensional and that more than two coalitions can
be observed at some time points (Leifeld 2013, 2016).
4.2 Methodology
We estimate two statistical models to test our theory on endogenous coalition forma-
tion. The first model is a stratified Cox proportional hazard model estimated through
conditional logit maximum likelihood estimation. This models the incidence of a state-
ment of a specific actor a about a specific policy belief b. The risk set is defined as the
set of statements that have not yet been issued but would eventually come to pass.
Alternatively, the risk set could have been defined to include all possible combi-
nations of actors, beliefs, and stances for every event day. However, this specification
would result in an event sequence containing 38,678,640 (245 actors × 69 beliefs × 2
stances × 1144 unique event days) true and null events. Due to the computational
burden of such an event sequence, we chose to define the risk set in accordance with
conditional logistic regression models, resulting in 883,855 events in the event sequence.
Hence, each day on which at least one statement is made forms a stratum and is filled
with statements that are made on this day (treatment or true events, = 1) as well as all
potential statements that could have been issued but were not (control or null events,
= 0). Where statements from the same actors and with the same stance are issued
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repeatedly over the course of the debate, these statements are repeatedly at risk until
the combination is issued for the last time.
The use of sufficient network statistics to capture dependencies between observations
in a survival model is known as a relational event model and was first proposed by Butts
(2008). Here, we extend this idea to accommodate custom network statistics formed
over a two-mode network. The network statistics are calculated for both true events as
well as null events.
The second model is a logistic regression model. The dependent variable is the sign
of an actor–belief statement (support or rejection; + or −) conditional on the existence
of the statement and the past network of events (de Nooy and Kleinnijenhuis 2013;
Lerner et al. 2013). While the survival model explains the timing and existence of
statements, this second model explains the stance of the statement as a function of
prior interactions (similar to de Nooy and Kleinnijenhuis 2013).
Lerner et al. (2013), Lerner (2016), and Brandes, Lerner and Snijders (2009) show
that the likelihood of both models can be added to form the overall likelihood of the
temporal topology of the policy debate. We extend the combined approach of Lerner
et al. (2013) by applying their relational event model for signed graphs to the bipartite
case using custom network statistics. The statistics we employ to operationalize our
theory are identical across the two models we estimate, including the use of positive
and negative signs on the dyads and the half-life parameter of 20 for Equation 2.
4.3 Control Variables
We include further control variables as sufficient statistics. Section ?? in the SI Online
contains further information on the specification of these model terms.
We include an interaction between each of the three main terms and a dummy
variable indicating whether the focal actor a is a government actor, such as a federal
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ministry or agency. We expect these actors to behave differently and act in a neutral
way because they have an official mandate. The interaction should have a negative sign
as policy belief learning should be less pronounced in government actors than in other
types of actors. The main effect for this dummy variable should be positive because
government actors are often in charge of issuing statements about policy making and
should therefore have a relative high statement density.
Furthermore, a model term called inertia controls for the repetition of statements
by the same actor. Actor activity serves a similar purpose as a random effect in cross-
sectional analyses; it controls for the propensity of each actor to make statements in the
debate. Belief concept popularity controls for issue attention cycles, i. e., swings in the
number of times a specific belief was recently stated. We control for a seasonal effect
of the week day Monday. News usually accumulate over the weekend, so more activity
can be expected on Mondays.
Section ?? of the SI Online contains specifications with additional control variables
for the logistic model. We control for actor type homophily, which is the tendency of
actors to agree with another actor on the stance of a policy belief if both actors are of the
same type (e. g., both are trade unions or social interest groups). This operationalizes
functional interdependencies as posited by Zafonte and Sabatier (1998). We also control
for expected conflict lines between trade unions/social interest groups on the one hand
and liberal actors/employers’ associations and financial market actors, such as banks
and insurance companies, on the other hand. These heterophily model terms control for
exogenously defined cleavage lines. The inclusion of both the homophily and heterophily
terms does not change the substantive results.
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5 Results
Table 1 shows the results of the survival model (the so-called rate function), and Table 2
shows the results of the logistic regression model (the so-called type function). Section
?? in the SI Online presents details on the standardization of the endogenous network
variables.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Table 2 about here.]
The results in Table 1 show strongly positive regression coefficients for all three
types of policy belief learning: positive reciprocity has a coefficient of 0.39, which
means that a one-unit increase in this statistic corresponds to an increase in the odds
of event occurrence by 48 percent for all non-governmental actors. All endogenous
network statistics are standardized. A one-unit increase in the statistic corresponds to
one standard deviation of positive reciprocity (sd = 0.065, min = 0, max = 0.584).
This increase represents approximately 11 additional shared beliefs between focal actor
a and i1, with a using j three days ago, i1 using j ten days ago, and i1 using b one day
ago (see Table ?? in the SI Online for additional scenarios on what an increase in one
standard deviation entails in network event terms). The effect of positive reciprocity is
significantly smaller for governmental actors.
An increase of the innovation learning statistic by one standard deviation increases
the odds that non-governmental actor a makes statement b at time t by 22 percent. For
the innovation learning statistic to increase by one standard deviation, a would have to
share two policy beliefs j with each actor i that stated b eight days ago (as one possible
scenario). Here, too, government actors have a lower propensity to pick up policy belief
concepts that were used by minimally congruent other actors than non-government
actors.
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There is a strong positive effect for negative reciprocity, with an increase in the
odds of a statement by 19 percent. The standard deviation for negative reciprocity
represents, for instance, an additional joint usage of three beliefs j in the recent past
(i1 stated b one day ago, a stated j three days ago, and i1 stated j ten days ago). As
such, this effect is more than three times as powerful as positive reciprocity (with one
standard deviation increase amounting to 11 additional shared beliefs j, given i1 stated
b one day ago, a stated j three days ago, and i1 stated j ten days ago). Actors have
a strong tendency to reject statements made by actors i with whom they disagreed
over other beliefs in the past. Both government and non-government actors exhibit this
behavior, i. e., the interaction effect is not significant.
Substantively, this lends strong support to hypotheses 1–3. In line with our model
of endogenous coalition formation, actors adopt policy beliefs from structurally proxi-
mate actors in an act of bonding, leading to cohesive coalitions (“positive reciprocity”);
they reinforce past experiences by learning which policy beliefs not to adopt as a func-
tion of past disagreements with actors, leading to a repulsion of coalitions (“negative
reciprocity”); and they learn from structurally more distant actors across coalitions,
provided that there is at least minimal agreement with those other actors and that
these minimally trusted other actors agree with each other on the policy belief concept
to be learned (“innovation learning”). Together, these mechanisms shape a topology
of the policy debate in which there are multiple cohesive advocacy or discourse coali-
tions which are, however, not completely separated due to the bridging aspect of policy
learning (in line with theoretical predictions by Leifeld 2014).
Figure 4 shows the values of the three statistics of main interest over time vis-a`-vis
the null events. Null events for each time point t include all statements that were
issued after t and, as such, were at risk of being issued at the focal time t. At each
point in time, the null events represent all future events that have not yet been issued.
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They form the control group to the group of statements that were issued at time t.
The conditional logistic model then evaluates which factors increase the probability of
an event occurring now, given it has not occurred before. The 95 percent confidence
interval around the blue curves indicates consistent significance at all time points. The
shape of the blue curves also indicates a change in the data-generating process. Ad-
ditional model specifications with a temporal dummy variable for the election period
and interactions with the variables of interest were tested and did not change the main
results significantly.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Model 2 is a variant of Model 1 that demonstrates that the substantive results
do not change when the interaction effects between the main variables of interest and
government activity are omitted. As for the control variables, actors show a tendency to
repeat themselves and jump on the bandwagon of recently widely-stated policy beliefs.
There is a small effect of statement occurrence on Mondays, and government actors are
more active than other actor types. The explained variance (according to McFadden
1978) is moderate at 0.14.
Table 2 demonstrates similar effects for the type function. While the rate function
models the rate of the occurrence of a statement by actor a on belief b, the type function
explains the stance of the statement, conditional on the fact that the statement occurs
and conditional on the past network. In this model, a positive statement of the belief
concept is modeled as 1 and negative use as 0. Due to the nature of the dependent
variable, the statistics of primary interest need to be subdivided into their constituent
parts for positive and negative (i1, b) relations (panels 1 and 3 in Figure 1 and panels 2
and 4 go together, respectively, for positive reciprocity and panels 6 and 8 and panels
5 and 7, respectively, for negative reciprocity).
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The results indicate that, as expected, positive reciprocity holds such that balanced
open four-cycles with a positive (i1, b) relation tend to be closed by a positive (a, b)
statement (the odds of a positive statement increase by 225 percent) and that balanced
open four-cycles with a negative (i1, b) relation prompt a negative (a, b) statement (the
odds of a positive statement decrease by 67 percent). This indicates that bonding
increases the incentives for further structural balance. The increase of one standard
deviation in positive reciprocity for positively (or negatively) stated policy beliefs b by
a represents an additional 13 (or seven) events actors a and i1 shared in the recent past
(a stated j three days ago, i1 stated j ten days ago, and i1 stated b one day ago) (see
Table ?? in the SI Online).
Conversely, as expected, negative reciprocity yields a reverse pattern. Past conflicts
are carried forward such that a positive statement on b by i1 prompts a negative one
by a and vice-versa if previous discursive alignments were conflictual. The odds of a
positive statement are increased by 129 percent if a has disagreed with another actor
i1 on three more beliefs j in the past (a stated j three days ago, and i1 stated j ten
days ago) and i1 opposed policy belief b one day ago. Similarly, the odds of a positive
statement decrease by 61 percent if a previous actor i1 agreed with policy belief b one
day ago and a and i1 contradicted each other on seven more beliefs in the past (a stated
j three days ago, and i1 stated j ten days ago).
There are mixed results for innovation learning in the type function, with one coeffi-
cient significant and the other one insignificant. If we interpret this result together with
the significant coefficient for innovation learning in the rate function, actors do learn
policy beliefs from minimally congruent actors (e. g., across coalitions), but this does
not generally mean that actors also agree on the issue stances (e. g., across coalitions)
once they have adopted a belief. They rather learn the policy belief concept, but not
the stance.
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In the type model, one does not need to control for actor activity because whether
an actor supports or rejects a belief is not theoretically linked to how often the actor
made statements in the past. However, one can see that past positive statements of
policy beliefs increases the odds of current positive use of the same belief concepts,
and the same is true for negative uses of these policy belief concepts, as indicated by
the belief concept popularity coefficients. Moreover, if an actor stated a specific belief
predominantly in a positive (negative) way in the recent past, the actor tends to state
the policy belief concept in the same way now, as shown by the inertia coefficients.
Figures 5 and 6 assess the goodness of fit of the rate model using simulations.
Figure 5 shows that our theory has some predictive value and greatly improves upon the
prediction of a random null model, for different difficulty levels of prediction. Only exact
time matches are counted as positive predictions in Figure 5. Since exact time matches
impose too strict a test on temporal predictions of events, we report the differences in
the timing of simulated versus random events vis-a`-vis true events in Figure 6. The
simulated sequence based on the fitted model predicts the timing of true events much
better than a random null model, i. e., the mean temporal prediction error is much
smaller. On average, the time difference between simulated and true event is 27 days
(sd = 28.9, min = 0, max = 188, median = 23), whereas the average time difference
between random and true events is 194 days (sd = 156.5, min = 0, max = 523, median
= 167).
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
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6 Conclusion
Overall, these results provide overwhelming empirical evidence for the three mechanisms
of learning that lead to endogenous coalition formation and maintenance. The evidence
is robust at two levels: the waiting time or probability per time unit that a statement by
a specific actor about a specific policy belief is made, and the stance of the statement.
This provides us with an understanding of how and why advocacy or discourse coalitions
are formed and maintained and, more broadly, how policy debates operate.
An assessment of the model fit also showed that there is room left for theoretical
improvement for the explanation of this complex dynamical system. However, it should
be noted that similarly complex dynamical systems, such as militarized interstate dis-
putes, regularly yield levels of explained variance below ten percent. While the poor
theoretical understanding of other systems by no means improves the value of our the-
oretical explanation in the present case, this indicates more generally that the social
sciences have a long way to go if we are to understand complex and often erratic social
behavior to a satisfactory degree.
The research presented here is an important step in this direction as we have pre-
sented innovative evidence for the structure and dynamics of how policy debates oper-
ate. We first presented a theory of coalition formation, maintenance, and repulsion in
policy processes based on policy beliefs and learning. This theory provides an innova-
tive understanding of the micro-level dynamics that underpin advocacy and discourse
coalitions and makes a contribution to this vast literature, which is all too often fo-
cused on the empirical identification, rather than explanation, of topological features
like coalitions.
More generally, we have laid the foundation for a theoretical as well as empirical
understanding of how policy debates work. Previous research on policy debates tended
to be more descriptive and one-dimensional. Our approach fully acknowledges the
26
multi-dimensional nature of policy debates as complex dynamical systems and offers a
theoretically informed lens that can be readily operationalized through the empirical
toolbox of inferential network analysis.
Work in this direction may ultimately enable us to forecast how policy debates will
develop, at least at a short range like a weather forecast. Such results can then be
used to evaluate scenarios for devising more efficient media campaigning strategies by
interest groups or political parties, or they could be employed for comparing styles of
deliberation across countries, or they could be used for the benefit of humanity, e. g.,
by avoiding polarization and political stalemate when the prediction points into this
direction. The work in this contribution is an important step into this direction, but
much more work needs to be done. Several research areas can be readily identified.
First, data collection needs to be made more efficient. Recent developments in natural
language processing and machine learning may soon help us to identify given policy be-
liefs in unstructured newspaper articles and connect them with the actors who sponsor
them, as identified through named entity recognition. Right now, the level of detail
required for a meaningful analysis of this kind still makes manual annotation of text
materials necessary, but important research is underway in several disciplines. Second,
a much better understanding needs to be developed about dynamic network models
for complex data structures, such as the relational event models for signed bipartite
graphs with a rate and type function and temporal decay used here. Little is known
about possible extensions; there are no simulation results that would verify the validity
of these extensions; there is no systematic way to ascertain that the sufficient statistics
are really sufficient etc. Right now, we are avoiding some of these potential problems by
verifying our results through evidence of predictive fit, but a better theoretical under-
standing of these kinds of network models would be important for their widespread use.
Third, a better understanding of how temporal dynamics should be modeled would be
27
important. For example, we employed a half-life parameter of 20 days in our models and
verified the robustness of this parameter through simulations. Yet, in principle, arbi-
trary combinations of different half-life parameters could be used for the different model
terms, and inclusion of these parameters in the likelihood function might potentially
cause statistical identification problems. Future research therefore needs to establish
best practices or at least a larger set of experiences to draw from when parameterizing
network dynamics.
Finally, we would like to point out that the policy debate analyzed here was selected
carefully, but may deviate from policy debates in other political systems, arenas, data
sources, policy domains, or contexts more generally. This opens the door to an excit-
ing research area where debates in different contexts can be compared to the baseline
findings established here.
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Figure 1: Positive reciprocity (first row) and negative reciprocity (second row).
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Figure 2: Bonding (first and second panel) and bridging (third and fourth panel).
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Figure 3: Frequency of statements per week.
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Figure 4: Value of the positive reciprocity, innovation learning, and negative reciprocity
statistics over time (blue curves from top to bottom) vis-a`-vis the null events (green
curves). The results are significant at all time points.
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Figure 5: Goodness-of-fit assessment through prediction. The barchart shows how
much the rate model improves the prediction of actors, beliefs, stances, or combinations
of these variables vis-a`-vis a null model. Only exact timing matches are counted.
Predictions were made within-sample over 50 event days between September 28, 1998
and December 16, 1998 (with a total of 391 statements). The risk set includes all
statements issued after September 28, 1998 (excluding duplicates). Standard errors are
based on 13 simulated sequences.
37
020
40
60
0 200 400
time between simulated and true event day
simulation random
Figure 6: Goodness-of-fit assessment through prediction. The two histograms show the
timing error of the simulated or random events. Predictions were made within-sample
over 50 event days between September 28, 1998 and December 16, 1998 (with a total
of 391 statements). The histograms are based on one of the thirteen simulated and
random sequences each. Horizontal dashed lines represent the mean difference between
the timing of simulated (or random) and true events (i. e., the temporal prediction
error).
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(1) (2)
Main hypotheses
Positive reciprocity 0.39 (0.03)∗∗∗ 0.31 (0.01)∗∗∗
Positive reciprocity × government org. −0.12 (0.03)∗∗∗
Innovation learning 0.20 (0.03)∗∗∗ 0.11 (0.01)∗∗∗
Innovation learning × government org. −0.10 (0.03)∗∗∗
Negative reciprocity 0.17 (0.02)∗∗∗ 0.18 (0.01)∗∗∗
Negative reciprocity × government org. −0.01 (0.03)
Control
Inertia 0.13 (0.01)∗∗∗ 0.12 (0.01)∗∗∗
Actor activity −0.01 (0.02) −0.02 (0.02)
Belief concept popularity 0.11 (0.01)∗∗∗ 0.12 (0.01)∗∗∗
Monday (dummy) 0.07 (0.04) 0.08 (0.04)∗
Government (dummy) 0.70 (0.04)∗∗∗ 0.47 (0.04)∗∗∗
AIC 54032.32 54113.86
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.14 0.13
Num. events 6044 6044
Num. obs. 883855 883855
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05; Coefficients are reported as log-odds.
Table 1: Results of the conditional logistic regression on the event rate.
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(3)
Main hypotheses
Pos. reciprocity (γ+(i1, b)) 1.18 (0.14)
∗∗∗
Pos. reciprocity (γ−(i1, b)) −1.12 (0.11)∗∗∗
Innovation learning (γ+(i1, b)) −0.03 (0.08)
Innovation learning (γ−(i1, b)) −0.16 (0.07)∗
Neg. reciprocity (γ+(i1, b)) −0.96 (0.12)∗∗∗
Neg. reciprocity (γ−(i1, b)) 0.83 (0.10)
∗∗∗
Control
Inertia (γ+(a, b)) 1.48 (0.11)∗∗∗
Inertia (γ−(a, b)) −1.51 (0.11)∗∗∗
Popularity (γ+(i, b)) 0.60 (0.08)∗∗∗
Popularity (γ−(i, b)) −0.68 (0.06)∗∗∗
Intercept 1.09 (0.06)∗∗∗
BIC 4850.22
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.37
Num. obs. 6044
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05; Coefficients are reported as log-odds.
Table 2: Logistic regression on agreement with a given policy belief.
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